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In several recent articles in Linacre Quarterly, Lisa Cahill has
offered an interesting defense of euthanasia from what she conceives
of as a "natural law" point of view. 1 In her discussion she presents a
novel interpretation of St. Thomas which leads to a revised understanding of the principle of totality and a consequent justification for
sacrificing a temporal, bodily good on behalf of a trans-temporal end,
the well-being of the " whole person" especially as this "person" is
religiously conceived of as a soul.
The argument presented for this viewpoint is quite simple and Ms.
Cahill is hardly the only one using it. Unfortunately, it is deeply
flawed in two fundamental ways.2 It begins with a serious misinterpretation of St. Thomas. 3 As a result of this error the argument ignores
the connection between private and public virtue and the consequent
powerful argument against euthanasia as a publicly allowable act or
policy. Each of these two points will receive comment below, but first
we must briefly review the argument at stake.
One version of the general argument is made in the following form:
1. The "whole person" is more important than the body.
2. The welfare of the "whole person" therefore transcends the welfare of the body.
3. In some cases the welfare of the person is harmed by continual
life in the body.
4. Therefore, in some cases euthanasia is morally permissible.

Essentially, this argument asks us to take seriously the transcendental end of the human person and to judge human activity in general
and individual acts in particular in light of this end. "Totality" is thus
enlarged from its narrow meaning in the manualists to include a
"wholistic view of the person that is much more plausible and more
theologically sound than that found in the older manualist tradition
with its heavy reliance on physiological categories. 4
.
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As applied to euthanasia issues, however, the above argument is
quite defective. First, on the question of the interpretation of Thomas
we must note several things.
1. Thomas would never hold proposition 2 in a blanket form. He
says quite clearly that suicide is never permissible. Using the terminology of "intrinsically" evil (which is basically manualist, anyway) just
obfuscates the issue. What we want to know is whether and under
what conditions the act in question is morally permissible, and on the
question of suicide Thomas is unmistakably clear. 5
2. The key weakness in the argument is the move from 3 to 4. This
is a move that Thomas would never make, at least not as it is stated
above. He would need to know all of the moral categories that should
be applied to an act and he would need to be convinced that none of
these categories, when applied to the act in question, led to its being
morally impermissible. It will do us well to briefly try this ourselves.
In a Thomistic context euthanasia would most directly fall under
the category of justice. To be sure, the other "self regarding" virtues
are relevant, but since euthanasia is principally an act involving a
patient and his physician it properly falls under the province of justice
as the one virtue that regulates interactions between persons. 6 For
Thomas, however, justice has two different forms or aspects, a fact
that many of these modern interpreters have overlooked.
The first form is the more common jus involved in the interaction
between two specific persons. If a patient contracts with his or her
physician to pay him for certain services (say, removal of a breast
lump) then a certain jus exists between them, and justice demands
that the physician perform the services he has agreed to perform and
that the patient pay accordingly. 7
The second form of justice is what Thomas calls "general" or
"legal" justice. In this regard he explains its meaning in a key passage:
Accordingly justice in its proper acceptation can be directed to another in
both these senses. Now it is evident that the individuals in a commu nity
stand in relation to that community as parts to a whole while a part as such
belongs to whole so that whatever is the good of a part can be directed to
the good of a whole. It is therefore that the good of any virtue whether such
virtue direct man in relation to himself or in relation to certain other individual persons is referable to the common good to which justice directs: So
that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice insofar as it directs man to the
common good. It is in this sense that justice is called a gen e ral virtue. And in
the sense that it belongs to the law to direct to the common good. . it
follows that the justice which in this way is styled general is called legal
justice ....
Consequently there must be one supreme virtue , essentially distinct from
every other virtue which directs all the virtues to the common good and this
virtue is legal justice. 8

What Thomas says here can hardly be missed by the perceptive
reader. He maintains that human life and activity occur within a
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specific political-social context: "Homo naturaliter est animal
sociale. "9 Given this truism, Thomas then argues that one category
under which all human activity must be judged is the impact of such
activity on the common good of the political regime within which that
activity takes place.1 0 An action that violates the common good of
that society cannot be permitted morally no matter how well it might
square with the other virtues; What must be stressed is that this is still
a moral judgment. We are still in the context of justice as a specific
virtue regulative of human acts. Quite simply, Thomas would never
maintain that an act could be morally permitted yet remain legally
proscribed on "public policy" grounds. If an act would be harmful or
wrong as public policy then Thomas is quite clear: it is not a morally
permissible act. 11
The above is simply a theoretical restatement of Thomas' position.
Essentially he asks us to reject the facile separation of public policy
and private morality that is common in our own day. He asks us to
consider the possibility that what we do in the concrete affects the
whole within which we live as well as determining the kind of moral
beings we will be in the future. If we are to be just as human beings
then we must live in a just community - one that we maintain by our
adherence to the principles of justice.

Essential to Understand Framework

It is essential to understand the above framework if we are to form
any kind of reasonable approach to the question of euthanasia on
Thomistic principles. If one overlooks the implications for the common good of euthanasia as a policy one is easily driven to reach
conclusions that are dubious or simply incoherent when such considerations are added. It seems to me that it is at this point that arguments
similar to those presented by Ms. Cahill fall apart.
As it is stated, the argument asks us to accept the proposition that
there are some lives not worth living any more. It is obvious that this
sort of judgment must be made in the context of decisions to withhold treatment or induce death, but t he full implications of this most
aweso me judgment are not obvious and are often ignored. Two implications of this judgment need to be amplified .
First, the policy demands of us a public judgment that some
ongoing human lives no longer merit the most minimal of civic rights
normally enjoyed by all other citizens.12 Secondly, it demands of us
that this judgment be one that can be fairly applied by anyone to
determine whether or not another person has or lacks the " life worth
living. " 13 We can best explicate the significance of both of these
points by examining a series of cases as follows:
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Case I. A patient asks his physician to withdraw life-saving therapy.
Now the physician is hardly going to automatically accede to this
request. He will recognize t hat any number of factors from mome ntary anguish or financial worries to actual clinical depression may
intervene as a contrai ndication . As a seriously concerned m oral agent,
he will ask what he should do, not just what the patient wants. He will
thus be co ncerned to decide for himself if this patient's request is at
all reasonabl e, i. e ., would it be reasonable for a patient in this condition to conclude that life is no longer worth living.
Case II. The parents of a newborn with abnormalities which would
lead to retardation and physical handicaps ask that the newborn not
be t reated . Again, t he doctor will ask what he sh ould do, not just what
the parents want. Surely he will not accede to a request from a
Jehovah's Witness to withdraw transfusion from a perfectly normal
child . If he will not, t hen it is clear that he will need to decide in
which cases h e is going to honor the request of the parents and in
which cases he is not.

Physicians Must Make Judgment

In both of these examples the physician is going to have to make an
independent judgment that the life in question is one that is not worth
living anymore. He will need to judge that in t h e instant case t h e right
of the person to expect the physician to save his life, to not have his
death engineered by others, is not to be respected. In other words, the
most primeval of our civic rights - the right to have life protected
from those intrusions of others t hat are designed to end it - is here to
be set aside. Secondly, this judgment must be a public judgment which
could be fairly applied to all other cases. What could be more unfair
than to decide that you know what the grounds are for this most final
judgment and then be unwilling to deny this great good to all others
who "deserve" it. Consider two infants with the sam e abnormalities . It
would be the worst injustice to decide that in the one case you will let
an infant die on the basis of a parental requ est and yet in the other
case "burden" the infant with continued life m erely because t h e parents want this.1 4 If t he physician, as an inde pendent m oral agent, has
decided that he has the wisdom to make such a judgment then he
ought to have the courage to apply his judgment justly .
What the physician is asked to do in the above cases is to violate a
normal prohibition against bringing about the death of another person, whether by actively inducing death or by withdrawing those
things the person n eeds to sustain life. Any such policy recommendation requires the formulation of a set of publicly announced standards
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or criteria by which we can know which lives are so worthless that
they no longer merit the most minimal protections afforded to all
other citizens. Failure to provide such a standard is an open door to
the worst abuses of an arbitrary grant of this awesome discretionary
power - the power to decide that one human being has a life so
devoid of worth or quality that he no longer merits the protections we
all take for granted. As Phillip Heyman and Sarah Holtz have recently
written:
It is not obvious there is one form of words or concepts available for
defining who is to be a full member of a society that promises greater
permanence in the face of changing political views and more consistent
application by large numbers of individuals than another form of expres·
sion. But if there is, surely there is an immense social advantage to adopting
the more permanent, more readily applicable form. Clear , lasting lines have
an immense social advantage in defining those who are to be considered
fully human and protected members of our society and excluding those who
are not. A sense of security and acceptance which underlies the very con·
cepts of rights and self respect and which is a precondition of human happiness, depends upon knowing when one or a member of one's family is a
fully protected member of the community. Society should be and is prepared to pay a great pri~e to define person· hood with considerable clarity.
Neither doctor, nor parents nor courts nor even legislatures should be
entrusted with discretionary decisions as to whose life can be taken with
impunity. Recent history is too full of examples of abuse of that dis·
cretion. 15

Furthermore, failure to provide such a standard, or providing only a
vague and open-ended one violates some of the most primitive norms
of moral discourse: 1) that a normative recommendation ought, when
generalized to all relevantly similar cases, lead to acceptable conclusions and 2) exceptions to a normative principle or rule ought to be
framed in such a way that the exceptions do not destroy the force of
the rule. 16
The immense difficulties of formulating a set of criteria that will
avoid these problems has never been squarely faced by the partisans of
euthanasia policies. Time and time again we are confronted with vague
claims about "death with dignity' or even more arbitrary and ill-conceived standards that can hardly be generalized, even in a modest
way. 17 As one example of these deficiencies, consider the current discussions of involuntary euthanasia of "defective newborns."
Since so much effort has gone into the discussion of the treatment
for severely defective newborns, one might suspect that clear, reasonable guidelines might have been developed that avoid the problems to
which I am pointing. Unfortunately, this seems to be a vain hope.
When we turn to this literature, we find a plethora of hopelessly vague
claims and an assortment of actual policy proposals as incoherent and
inapplicable as would be a proposal to reintroduce slavery. Examples
are numerous. Some writers have claimed that infants lacking any
May, 1980
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ability or potential to " relate to others" ought to be candidates for
death.1 8 Of course they never tell us how much or how little of this
ability is required since, if the level is set even modestly high, we wind
up with frightening advice about what to do with illness in thousands
of severely retarded persons and if even the smallest amount of the
potential qualifies , then the policy is self-defeating since almost any
infant would qualify.19 Others have focused on the presence of severe
retardation alone, again with no attention to what this means if fairly
applied to all other retarded persons , nor with any rationale beyond
circular claims about " burdensomeness" for why we should consider
retardation so important. 20 Still others have focused on the presence
of multiple handicaps such as non-ambulation, bowel incontinence,
blindness and /or retardation, without of course telling us what relation any of these handicaps has with a life not worth living nor confronting what such a policy would mean for all other persons similarly
situated. 21 Finally, one writer seems content with telling us that some
defective infants will be great burdens on their families. 22
It seems obvious that until we are given reasonably precise , coherent and generalizable criteria for deciding that one human life is no
longer worth living, the policies under review in cases 1 and 2 will fail
even the most minimal test of rationality and fairness. This criticism
ought to be sufficient to put to rest the argument so far presented on
behalf of such views. In the last section of this essay, however, I would
like to suggest an even more far-reaching point: that the search for
such criteria represents an ultimate perversion of the liberal principles
on which our regime was founded and that until we contemplate
endorsing a fundamentally, different sort of polity the idea of " life not
worth living" ought to be as much of a "closed question " insofar as
public policy is concerned, as slavery has become. 23

Pretense or Arbitrariness

The proposition that there is such a thing as a life not worth living
amounts to the claim that so me human lives are not to be protected
by the normal constraints which protect the rest of us in our everyday
lives. More specifically, this, is either a pretension to have a type of
knowledge that our society always has denied it possessed or else it is
merely an example of the worst and most nihilistic arbitrariness. To
state the second alternative is to refute it, so we will consider the first
briefly.
The claim to this sort of knowledge represents a systematic rejection of the compromise found at the heart of liberal political philosophy and embodied in the founding documents of the American
re gi me (The Declaration of Independence and the Constitu-
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tion).24 Philosophically speaking, this compromise was constituted by
a turning away from the ancient concern for virtue as the end of
political life. As philosphers, the founders of liberalism were skeptical
of any such claims to know the ultimately good and worthwhile life in
a definitive and politically applicable manner. As students of history
and political affairs they knew even better how often such pretensions
can be abused. They had too many memories of the Star Chamber, the
Inquisition, or bills of attainder. As students of biblical and ancient
history they knew what happened to the wise Solomon and the fate of
Rome after the genius of Augustus.
Founders of Liberalism Sought New Regime

I )

The founders of liberalism thus sought to construct a regime which
would close off the possibility of a philosopher-king as the price for
avoiding the unrestrained rule of a Nero or a Claudius. 25 They sought
a regime which abstracted from any attempt to set forth the knowledge of the Ultimately worthwhile or worthless life. Such knowledge
was not within human purview and to pretend that it was only led to
the worst results both for individuals and for the political communities in which they lived .
Since such knowledge was not politically available, liberal regimes
have historically asserted that every life was of equal political worth,
especially with respect to the most minimal of civic rights. All men
were endowed with the minimal rights of "life, liberty and the pursuit
of happiness," and the role of politics was reduced to preserving persons in the exercise of these minimal rights, nothing more. 26 In this
sense we might generally say that the belief in human equality vis-a-vis
the ends of politics is the sine qua non of liberal regimes. However, the
two constitutive features of our regime, liberty and equality, cannot
be separated. The liberal commitment to human freedom renders necessary the protection of the equal minimal rights of every person. The
reverse is just as true. Only a commitment to the equal basic worth of
every person renders coherent the commitment to liberty. If it is
really believed that someone has a life not worth living, then those
who supposedly "know" this know something about what makes life
ultimately worthwhile, which should be given appropriate shape in
public policies restricting freedom and preventing the burdening of
some beings with continued life. Surely if we really are convinced of
our knowledge in this matter, then the most inconsistent and unjust
thing to do would be to deprive the rest of us the benefits of laws
based on this knowledge -laws that will restrict our freedom to
define the worthwhile life for ourselves.
Liberal regimes are thus committed to the principles of liberty and
equality as constitutive of their very essence. Though they do seek to
May, 1980
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foster the widest possible scope for individual liberty to pursue idiosyncratic ends and private pleasures, they also deliberately close off
those policy alternatives that conflict so deeply with their very essence
that to permit them is to pervert the very meaning of liberalism
beyond any conceivable degree of mere accommodation to historical
circumstance. It is these constitutive principles of liberal regimes,
embodying their specific genius, that transcend the matrix of private
passion and political discussion they foster and protect. Insofar as
these principles are concerned, the liberal citizen is not free to act in
ways destructive of the very essence of the polity; he is not free to
enslave another or sell himself into slavery nor is he free to treat
another as if he were an animal, conducting risky or lethal experiments on those he considers to be worthless or bestial. Even the great
liberal, Mill, recognized that one ought not to be free to sell oneself
into slavery, no matter how happy one might be enslaved. 27
This dialectical truth at the heart of liberalism that Mill seems to
have obliquely realized - that some policy questions must remain
"closed" even in a liberal regime - was given a most profound articulation in America by Abraham Lincoln. In the turbulent decade
before the Civil War, Lincoln engaged in a remarkable series of public
debates and speeches as penetrating in their content as any public
messages in our political experience. The deepest meaning of his message bears remembering here. 28
Very briefly, Lincoln argued that the real evil in slavery was not its
denial of liberty, as egregious as that might be . The real issue was that
a policy of slavery ended up treating one ostensible human being as if
he were not a human being at all. Slavery did not just deny to one
person the rights and privileges enjoyed by another. It ended up asserting that the enslaved had no political rights at all. In political terms
the enslaved had been reduced to an animalistic existence, deprived of
even the most primitive and inalienable rights with which other men
are supposedly endowed. This was the worst evil of slavery. It denied
the status of the slave as one whose freedom and civil equality were to
be protected. The slave was no longer human; he was now a "brute" in
Lincoln's words. Not being human, he had no liberty and no civil
status from which to claim his equality and liberty and to challenge
those who denied either one. In one of his key addresses he put the
point succinctly:
I ask attention to the fact that in a prominent degree these popular sovereigns are at this work: blowing out the moral lights around us, teaching that
the Negro is no longer a man but a brute, that the Declaration has nothing
to do with him, that he ranks with the crocodile and the reptile , that man
with body and soul is a matter of dollars and cents. I suggest to this portion
of Ohio Republicans, or Democrats if there be any present, the serious
consideration of this fact that there is now going on among you a steady
process of debauching public opinion on this subject. 29
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Lincoln knew the dialectical truth of liberalism that we have forgotten. Amid the pressures to amend our social rules and create different
forms of social organization, the principles embodied in constitutions
and charters of government must transcend the political matrix of free
action that these very principles protect. These principles define the
very essence of our life together as a people. They seek to give us a
vision of our ultimate commitments as a society and define for us who
counts as a member of this society. To ignore these principles is not
only to ask that they be changed in their particulars, but also to ask
for a fundamentally different sort of regime, a question few of us are
really prepared to ask.
Specific Questions of Euthanasia Debate

1

I

This is the only appropriate place to begin to consider the specific
questions of the euthanasia debate- to recognize that once we decide
that one ongoing human life is not worth living, we have taken a momentous step. We have declared our independence from our past, as it
were, and decided that for this one life, Lincoln's proposition that the
American regime was "dedicated to the proposition that all men are
created equal" is not true. Furthermore, we have decided that we, the
"normal," the "healthy," know how to tell when the life of another
moves over that line which marks the existence of the rest of us as
beings worthy of protection from the machinations of others.
To say, as Ms. Cahill and others do, that their recommendations are
made "in accord with the full human dignity and value of the dying
individual" is simply incoherent. 30 In political terms, the dignity of
the individual is usually expressed in prohibitions against activities of
the sort these writers now wish to sanction. Prima facie, these same
prohibitions ought to apply as measures of our commitment to the
worth of these individuals. Why don't they? Because these individuals
supposedly lack the worth that all the rest of us have, the worth that
makes our polity value and protect us. In political terms, no better
definition could be had of trying to read someone out of the human
family. Such is the logical outcome of these arguments.
It will perhaps be said that the above argument is defective because
it relies on a "wedge" claim that predicts social disaster if a first
euthanasia step is taken . Since we have no reason to suppose that all
physicians are as depraved as the Nazis, my argument will not work.
This is a gross misunderstanding of my point. I have no such prescience as this and I am not claiming to predict the future. What I am
claiming is that all policies for engineering the death of some ongoing,
savable human lives logically involve one fundamental judgment that
represents a radical departure from our most cherished principles.
Secondly, I am claiming that the most primitive requirements of moral
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discourse lead us to conclude that the policies we have so far seen
developed in the literature would logically apply to thousands of persons who are also debilitated, retarded, handicapped, etc. 31
The argument I am making does not predict the future. It asks what
is the logical outcome of the proposed policies. It assumes that the
proponents of these policies wish them to be applied fairly and asks
what this would mean for thousands of other persons similarly situated. If the proponents wish to give up the requirement of fair application then they must come forward with a compelling case for doing
so. Until then, the logic of their arguments leads them in ways in
which I seriously doubt any of them are prepared to go.
In the last decade the problems of "euthanasia," of "death with
dignity," and of withdrawing care from the defective and the d ebilitated have become a focus of national debate. Yet when all the
clamor has stopped, the intractable problems for the devotees of these
views remain. We are still in need of clear, coherent and applicable
criteria for deciding just when a person is a candidate for death. We
are still in need of criteria that will not logically lead to frightening
results if applied fairly to all those similarly situated. Finally, the
search for such standards still involves us in that historic break from
the liberal tradition of respecting the 9inimal rights of every person
equally.
In his finest piece of political rhetoric, Lincoln reminded us that
our regime was "dedicated to the proposition that all men are created
equal." As he well knew, the ultimate perversion of that belief was the
assertion that some men were so superior they could decide to treat
others as if they were not equal even in the most minimal of political
senses. Might we not see another example of this pretension among
those who now wish to endorse as a final solution to the problems of
the helpless and the debilitated a policy which ends in claiming that
some human lives are not worth protecting and sustaining anymore? 32
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People, ed. by R. W. Johannsen and Harry Jaffa (Columbus: Ohio State University
Press, 1959), pp. 267·268.
30. Cahill, "Comment on Euthanasia," p. 300.
31. Most of the defenders of euthanasia have simply failed to understand that
the so-called "wedge" argument is best formulated as a logical claim about what a
given policy logically commits us to. Stated in this form the only effective reply
will be a theoretical demonstration that the policy does not logically commit us to
certain courses of action. Any attempt to refute it by various " it can't happen
here" arguments is simply irrelevant.
32. It should be obvious that the position I have taken does not involve any of
the more common distinctions in the discussion of these matters. Whether or not
we actively induce death or passively withdraw therapy, the judgment about a life
not worth living is the same. The same is true concerning the distinction between
voluntary and involuntary euthanasia as can be seen from cases 1 and 2 above.
Finally, on the grounds I have laid out, the suppose d distinction betwee n ordinary
and extraordinary means is likewise without merit, sinc e whether the means of
sustaining life is ordinary or extraordinary, the judgment concerning its removal is
the same as that which we have been examining.
I do not have the space to argue it here, but I do believe that one useful
distinction is between those lives which can be saved by medical therapy and
those where dying is only prolonged in cases of terminal illness. This latter distinction can be made in terms of a judgment about how to live while dying (e.g., with
chemotherapy or not) and not in terms of a judgment that one life, like Karen
Quinlan's, is not worth living anymore.
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